Sesión ordinaria del Seminario (20-3-2012)

Fecha / Date: 20-3-2012.

Hora / Time: 10:15 h.

Lugar / Location: Seminario de Lógica de la Facultad de Filosofía - Universidad de Sevilla.

Ponente / Lecturer: Fernando R. Velázquez Quesada.

Título / Tittle: Introspection as an action. [work in progress]

Resumen / Abstract:
One of the reasons of the success of epistemic logic is that it allows us to express not only an agent's knowledge about facts, but also her knowledge about her own (lack of) knowledge. In particular, since knowledge is typically modelled with equivalence epistemic relations, a typical epistemic logic agent has full positive and negative introspection: if she knows a given P, then she knows that she knows it (a property that, at the level of frames, corresponds to a transitive epistemic relation), and if she does not know P, she knows that she does not know it (a property that, at the level of frames, corresponds to an euclidean epistemic relation). Our work takes a different approach to introspection. We start with agents that do not need to be introspective (that is, we work with models that are only reflexive: neither transitive nor euclidean), and we analyse the actions that the agent needs to perform in order to get positive and negative introspection.